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Heym

Self-hosted platform for building and running agentic systems and business-process automations.

3Advisories
0critical
3high
0medium
2026-11-21Latest
Timeline · advisories per quarter
32026 Q4
Named in sources

Reported for Heym

01. highCode executionNew this weekHeym: any workflow user could read backend files (incl. the Kubernetes service-account token) via Playwright file:// steps, collaborators could steal the owner's credentials via error_workflow_id, and the Python tool sandbox could be escaped (CVE-2026-134360, CVE-2026-110873, CVE-2026-55376)Three more flaws in Heym, the self-hosted agentic workflow platform. Newest (CVE-2026-134360, fixed 0.0.148): the Playwright node's navigate step passed its URL to page.goto() without checking the scheme, and step-based scripts run inside the backend container instead of the sandbox, so any signed-in user who can run a workflow could navigate to file:///… and use getText to read known-path files such as the Kubernetes ServiceAccount token or Docker secrets; AI steps passed model-chosen URLs the same way. CVE-2026-110873 (0.0.55 to 0.0.120, fixed 0.0.121): a shared collaborator could point a workflow's error_workflow_id at their own workflow, and when the parent errored the owner's decrypted credentials were injected into it. CVE-2026-55376 (fixed 0.0.40): the blacklist-based Python tool sandbox could be escaped through allowed standard-library modules, giving command execution as the backend user. Heym 2026-11-21 02. highCode executionNew this weekCVE-2026-130753: heym's Playwright step-mode node let non-admin workflow authors run Python as root in the backend container (fixed 0.0.142)In heym, the self-hosted platform for AI agents and workflow automation, the Playwright node's step mode (on by default) generates a Python script and then runs a second pass, _resolve_expressions_in_code, that splices workflow values into the already-generated source. Before 0.0.142, an authenticated non-admin workflow author could set a step field, or an upstream value a $-reference points to, that breaks out of the string literal and adds their own Python. The script then runs unsandboxed as root in the backend container, even with custom-code mode disabled. It is a remaining variant not covered by the earlier fix GHSA-mp23-7m6r-jfw4. Heym 2026-11-18 03. highCode executionHeym agent platform: 7 CVEs incl. command execution via MCP stdio fetch-tools and Playwright node RCE by any logged-in user, fixed in 0.0.75Heym, a self-hosted platform for agentic workflows, received seven CVEs on 11 Nov 2026. The worst let any authenticated user, even the lowest role or a freshly registered account, run commands on the backend host through POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools with the stdio transport (CVE-2026-67546) or through a Playwright node's Python code (CVE-2026-67544). Fixes landed between 0.0.70 and 0.0.75; upgrade to 0.0.75 or later. Heym MCP SDKs & servers 2026-11-11
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