Heym: any workflow user could read backend files (incl. the Kubernetes service-account token) via Playwright file:// steps, collaborators could steal the owner's credentials via error_workflow_id, and the Python tool sandbox could be escaped (CVE-2026-134360, CVE-2026-110873, CVE-2026-55376)
Three more flaws in Heym, the self-hosted agentic workflow platform. Newest (CVE-2026-134360, fixed 0.0.148): the Playwright node's navigate step passed its URL to page.goto() without checking the scheme, and step-based scripts run inside the backend container instead of the sandbox, so any signed-in user who can run a workflow could navigate to file:///… and use getText to read known-path files such as the Kubernetes ServiceAccount token or Docker secrets; AI steps passed model-chosen URLs the same way. CVE-2026-110873 (0.0.55 to 0.0.120, fixed 0.0.121): a shared collaborator could point a workflow's error_workflow_id at their own workflow, and when the parent errored the owner's decrypted credentials were injected into it. CVE-2026-55376 (fixed 0.0.40): the blacklist-based Python tool sandbox could be escaped through allowed standard-library modules, giving command execution as the backend user.
What it is
CVE-2026-134360 (GHSA-hmfh-wpg2-vff4): services/playwright_code_generator.py passes navigate URLs straight to page.goto(); nodes/playwright_node.py runs step-based scripts in the backend container. The reporter confirmed reading a mounted ServiceAccount token as a newly registered non-admin user on the 0.0.145 release image; 0.0.146 and 0.0.147 are also affected. In the release image the browser runs as root. With the sandbox enabled, that token's Role can create/delete pods in Heym's namespace, which the advisory chains to reading secrets such as ENCRYPTION_KEY and DATABASE_URL. Reported by amasolov.
CVE-2026-110873 (GHSA-c3f4-2mrj-jfqr): error_workflow_id was missing from OWNER_ONLY_EXECUTION_FIELDS in backend/app/api/workflows.py, so PUT /api/workflows/{id} let a collaborator change it. The error runner falls back to the owner's credential context, so an HTTP node in the attacker's error workflow could exfiltrate every credential the owner holds.
CVE-2026-55376 (GHSA-wcgw-9hfw-f6f2): backend/app/services/python_tool_executor.py allowed standard-library modules whose public attributes expose OS, process and filesystem access, then ran the user's tool with exec(). Needs a user who can create or edit a workflow with an Agent custom Python tool.
NVD published CVE-2026-134360 on 21 November 2026; CVE-2026-110873 and CVE-2026-55376 were published by NVD on 14 and 13 October 2026.
How to check
- Check your Heym version (container image tag ghcr.io/heymrun/heym:<version>).
- Review workflows for Playwright navigate steps with file:// URLs and for error_workflow_id values that point at workflows owned by someone else.
- On Kubernetes, check what the backend pod's ServiceAccount is allowed to do.
How to fix
- Upgrade Heym to 0.0.148 or later (also covers the 0.0.121 and 0.0.40 fixes).
- If untrusted or self-registered users could run workflows on an older version, rotate the Kubernetes ServiceAccount token, ENCRYPTION_KEY/SECRET_KEY, database credentials and the credentials stored in Heym.
- Disable open self-registration on shared instances and only share workflows with trusted collaborators.
docker ps --format '{{.Image}}' | grep -i heym
# Kubernetes
kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.containers[*].image}{"\n"}{end}' | grep -i heym Sources
- GitHub advisory GHSA-hmfh-wpg2-vff4: Step-based Playwright navigates to file:// URLs: any user can read files in the backend container ↗
- GitHub advisory GHSA-c3f4-2mrj-jfqr: Collaborator credential theft via error_workflow_id ↗
- GitHub advisory GHSA-wcgw-9hfw-f6f2: heym Python Tool Sandbox Escape ↗
- NVD: CVE-2026-134360 ↗
- NVD: CVE-2026-110873 ↗
- NVD: CVE-2026-55376 ↗