Heym agent platform: 7 CVEs incl. command execution via MCP stdio fetch-tools and Playwright node RCE by any logged-in user, fixed in 0.0.75
Heym, a self-hosted platform for agentic workflows, received seven CVEs on 11 Nov 2026. The worst let any authenticated user, even the lowest role or a freshly registered account, run commands on the backend host through POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools with the stdio transport (CVE-2026-67546) or through a Playwright node's Python code (CVE-2026-67544). Fixes landed between 0.0.70 and 0.0.75; upgrade to 0.0.75 or later.
What it is
CVE-2026-67546 (fixed 0.0.75): POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools accepts the stdio transport and spawns the caller-supplied command and args with the backend environment before MCP validation fails. 0.0.75 runs stdio MCP servers in a throwaway container (HEYM_MCP_STDIO_SANDBOX).
CVE-2026-67544 (fixed 0.0.71): the playwrightCode field of a Playwright node is written to a .py file and run with no sandbox or role check, giving RCE as the service user (root in the default Docker deployment).
CVE-2026-67542 (fixed 0.0.70): the same fetch-tools endpoint fetches attacker URLs over sse/streamable_http with no private-IP guard, a semi-blind SSRF. CVE-2026-67545 (fixed 0.0.73): the HTTP workflow node has no SSRF protection, reachable anonymously if a workflow is exposed that way.
CVE-2026-67543 (fixed 0.0.70): skill Python runs as a local subprocess instead of the Docker sandbox used for Python tools.
CVE-2026-67541 (fixed 0.0.70): any team member can add accounts to a team and then decrypt credentials shared into it (provider API keys, OAuth tokens). CVE-2026-67540 (fixed 0.0.70, medium): private workflow templates readable by any user by ID.
How to check
- Check the Heym version you run (release tag or image tag); anything below 0.0.75 has at least CVE-2026-67546.
- Check whether open registration is on and who has accounts, since most of these need only a logged-in user.
How to fix
- Upgrade Heym to 0.0.75 or later and keep HEYM_MCP_STDIO_SANDBOX enabled.
- After upgrading, rotate provider API keys and OAuth tokens stored in shared team credentials, review team memberships, and turn off open sign-up if you do not need it.
docker ps --format '{{.Image}}' | grep -i heym
# then pull v0.0.75 or later and redeploy Sources
- highHeym: any workflow user could read backend files (incl. the Kubernetes service-account token) via Playwright file:// steps, collaborators could steal the owner's credentials via error_workflow_id, and the Python tool sandbox could be escaped (CVE-2026-134360, CVE-2026-110873, CVE-2026-55376)
- highCVE-2026-130753: heym's Playwright step-mode node let non-admin workflow authors run Python as root in the backend container (fixed 0.0.142)