Three MCP servers let tool calls read or write files anywhere: yt-mcp uploads any file to YouTrack, Gortex and Zyrabit write outside their roots (CVE-2026-75612, CVE-2026-62964, CVE-2026-130154)
CVEs published on 18 November 2026 cover three MCP servers whose file tools trusted caller-supplied paths, so a malicious MCP client or an agent steered by prompt injection could reach files outside the intended directory. Gortex before 0.55.0 (write_file, edit_file, move_inline) writes anywhere the daemon user can, which leads to code execution via shell profiles or git hooks. yt-mcp before 1.18.1 (a YouTrack MCP server for Claude Code) reads any file and uploads it to a YouTrack issue. Zyrabit SLM before 2.4.4 (import_to_vault) copies arbitrary files in and out of its RAG vault. All three are fixed.
What it is
Gortex (Go module github.com/zzet/gortex, < 0.55.0; CVE-2026-62964, GHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p): resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from repo-root confinement, and the write handlers skip guardSymlinkWithinRepo, which read_file does call. One write_file call with an absolute path can create or overwrite ~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit or a cron/systemd unit. Fixed in 0.55.0 (28 June 2026).
yt-mcp (PyPI, <= 1.18.0; CVE-2026-75612, GHSA-99mq-fjjc-6v9j): the add_attachment tool only checks that file_path exists, then reads it and uploads the bytes to a YouTrack issue. Any file the server can read (SSH keys, credential and .env files) can be exfiltrated to an issue the attacker can see. get_project_health also let a project value with ../ write .json snapshots outside the snapshots directory. Fixed in 1.18.1 (10 July 2026).
Zyrabit SLM (PyPI zyrabit-slm, < 2.4.4; CVE-2026-130154, GHSA-r4q8-hjfc-ggp2): the import_to_vault MCP tool joins destination_name onto the docs directory without validation, so ../ or an absolute path writes outside the vault. An arbitrary source_path is copied into the vault and can be read back with secure_query. With ENABLE_LEGACY_EXTENSIONS=true (off by default), POST /mcp/rpc is registered without authentication. Fixed in 2.4.4 (15 September 2026).
The common pattern: path arguments chosen by the model or client are trusted. Treat every path argument in an MCP tool as attacker input.
How to check
- Check whether your MCP client configs launch gortex, yt-mcp or Zyrabit, and which versions.
- For Gortex, look for unexpected changes to shell profiles, git hooks, cron entries and systemd user units on machines where it ran.
- For yt-mcp, review recent YouTrack issue attachments created through the server's account.
How to fix
- Upgrade Gortex to 0.55.0, yt-mcp to 1.18.1 and zyrabit-slm to 2.4.4 or later.
- If yt-mcp may have uploaded secrets, rotate them and delete the attachments.
- Run MCP servers as a low-privilege user or in a container with only the project directory mounted, and keep human approval on for file-writing tools.
pip show yt-mcp zyrabit-slm 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^(Name|Version)'
gortex --version 2>/dev/null
grep -rnE 'gortex|yt-mcp|zyrabit' ~/.claude.json ~/.cursor/mcp.json 2>/dev/null Sources
- criticalMalicious npm package @guicai777/mcp-doctor posed as an MCP diagnostic tool and dropped a hidden Windows executable, with a README telling users to run mshta (MAL-2026-20295)
- criticalCVE-2026-77359: Jupyter MCP Server's /api/connect and /api/stop routes skipped the token and Origin checks, so a website or network caller could repoint it to an attacker's Jupyter backend (fixed 1.0.3)
- criticalMalicious npm packages posing as AI SDKs and MCP servers: character-ai-sdk, char-ai-sdk, @mibbp/agent-observer, mrnima-openai-chatgpt-bot and @fdcasj_dfew/md-doc-mcp
- criticalCVE-2026-76807: Doist's official Todoist MCP HTTP server let any website use DNS rebinding to read, create and delete your Todoist data (fixed 10.3.3)