CVE-2026-129235: Kubeshark's MCP download_file tool wrote to any path the agent chose, and could pull captured traffic from auth-less Hubs (fixed 53.4.0)
Kubeshark, an eBPF network-observability tool for Kubernetes, ships a local stdio MCP server (kubeshark mcp). From 53.1.0 until 53.4.0 its download_file tool took a caller-supplied Hub API path and local dest and wrote the response with os.Create(dest) without any confinement. Indirect prompt injection against an agent driving kubeshark mcp could therefore write Hub-supplied bytes to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.kube/config or ~/.bashrc, and fetch any Hub endpoint, including captured-traffic exports on default auth-disabled Hubs. The tool is registered even without --allow-destructive. Fixed in 53.4.0; Hub authentication is still off by default.
What it is
callDownloadFile in cmd/mcpRunner.go passed dest straight to os.Create and appended path to the Hub API base URL with no allowlist (introduced in commit eb7dc42b, first released in v53.1.0).
The reporter (novice-22 / Urim) used export_snapshot_pcap then download_file to retrieve a captured PCAP and recover a planted Authorization: Bearer credential, and showed writes to arbitrary local paths. Reliable code execution wasn't demonstrated because the content is limited to what the Hub returns.
53.4.0 (commit a76a1920, PR #1957) confines dest to a base directory (CWD or KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR), rejects .. in path, re-checks after resolving symlinks and opens with O_NOFOLLOW. GitHub published the advisory on 13 August 2026; NVD on 16 November 2026.
How to check
- Run kubeshark version; 53.1.0 up to 53.3.x is affected if you've added kubeshark mcp to an AI agent or IDE.
- Check whether your Hub has authentication enabled (AUTH_ENABLED); if not, anything that reaches the Hub API can read captured traffic.
How to fix
- Upgrade the kubeshark CLI to 53.4.0 or later.
- Run kubeshark mcp as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory and don't let the same agent session read untrusted content.
- Enable Hub authentication so captured traffic (tokens, credentials, PII) isn't readable without login.
kubeshark version
grep -rn 'kubeshark' ~/.cursor/mcp.json ~/.claude.json ~/Library/Application\ Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json 2>/dev/null Sources
- criticalMalicious npm package @guicai777/mcp-doctor posed as an MCP diagnostic tool and dropped a hidden Windows executable, with a README telling users to run mshta (MAL-2026-20295)
- criticalCVE-2026-77359: Jupyter MCP Server's /api/connect and /api/stop routes skipped the token and Origin checks, so a website or network caller could repoint it to an attacker's Jupyter backend (fixed 1.0.3)
- criticalMalicious npm packages posing as AI SDKs and MCP servers: character-ai-sdk, char-ai-sdk, @mibbp/agent-observer, mrnima-openai-chatgpt-bot and @fdcasj_dfew/md-doc-mcp
- criticalCVE-2026-76807: Doist's official Todoist MCP HTTP server let any website use DNS rebinding to read, create and delete your Todoist data (fixed 10.3.3)