CVE-2026-63189: Dialoqbase chatbot builder let anyone read server files through /api/v1/view/*, leaking the JWT key for full admin takeover (fixed 1.11.5)
Dialoqbase, a self-hosted app for building RAG chatbots, served uploads through an unauthenticated GET /api/v1/view/* route that resolved the wildcard path with no normalization or containment. Through 1.11.4 anyone who can reach the server can read arbitrary files, for example /proc/self/environ or .env. Those expose DB_SECRET_KEY, the JWT signing key, so an attacker can forge an admin token and take over every bot, conversation, integration and stored third-party credential. Fixed in 1.11.5; rotate DB_SECRET_KEY after upgrading.
What it is
The bug is in server/src/routes/api/v1/view/root.ts and dates back to commit 1e2ae50 (September 2023). Example requests from the advisory: GET /api/v1/view/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd and GET /api/v1/view/../../../../../../../../proc/self/environ, with no auth header.
Version 1.11.5 (PR #317) confines reads to a fixed uploads directory and returns 404 for anything that resolves outside it. The advisory says there is no safe workaround other than blocking the route at a reverse proxy.
Reported by kta1kri. The Dialoqbase repository is now archived; the maintainer says critical security fixes may still be shipped by temporarily unarchiving it.
How to check
- Check the Dialoqbase version you run (Docker image tag or package.json); 1.11.4 and earlier are affected.
- Search your reverse-proxy logs for /api/v1/view/ requests containing ../ or %2e%2e.
How to fix
- Upgrade Dialoqbase to 1.11.5 or later.
- Rotate DB_SECRET_KEY (this logs everyone out) and every provider API key or bot token stored in Dialoqbase if the server was reachable while it ran an affected version.
- If you can't upgrade right away, block /api/v1/view/ paths containing traversal sequences at your reverse proxy.
# look for traversal attempts against the view route
grep -E '/api/v1/view/.*(\.\./|%2e%2e)' /var/log/nginx/access.log*