CVE-2026-63129: mssql-mcp servers built T-SQL from tool arguments, so a steered agent could run stacked SQL before the confirmation step (fixed core/server 0.6.0, reader/writer 0.5.0)
@connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core, the shared library behind the mssql-mcp reader, writer and server MCP packages for Microsoft SQL Server, interpolated table names, column names, index and schema identifiers and a free-form whereClause into T-SQL batches, parameterizing only data values. A malicious MCP client or an LLM agent steered by indirect prompt injection could run stacked DDL/DML, read or destroy data and, with a privileged login and xp_cmdshell enabled, run OS commands. Row-count and preview queries ran before confirmUpdate/confirmDelete, so the injection fired on the first call and skipped the confirmation and maxRows safeguards. Even the read-only list_databases tool was injectable through stateFilter.
What it is
Affected tools: update_data, delete_data and execute_transaction (tableName, whereClause), insert_data (tableName, column keys), create_table, create_index and drop_table (identifiers), and list_databases (stateFilter, only guarded by an input-schema enum that wasn't enforced). The stateFilter sink is reachable even with READONLY=true and in the reader package.
Affected packages: @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core <= 0.5.0, @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-server <= 0.5.2, @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-reader <= 0.4.2, @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-writer <= 0.4.2.
The fix (core 0.6.0) validates and bracket-quotes all identifiers, removes the free-form whereClause in favor of structured, parameterized filters (a breaking change), and allowlists stateFilter.
How to check
- Run npm ls for the four @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-* packages (globally too if your MCP client starts them with npx) and compare with the fixed versions.
- Check whether the SQL login the server uses is privileged and whether xp_cmdshell is enabled.
How to fix
- Upgrade to @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core 0.6.0, mssql-mcp-server 0.6.0, mssql-mcp-reader 0.5.0 and mssql-mcp-writer 0.5.0 or later; the upgrade is the only complete fix.
- Run the server under a least-privilege SQL login with xp_cmdshell disabled, and limit which MCP clients can call the tools.
npm ls @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-server @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-reader @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-writer
npm ls -g @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-server Sources
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