CVE-2026-57145: PraisonAI's multiedit tool lets the model read and overwrite any file
PraisonAI's multiedit agent tool passed the model-controlled file path straight to open() for reading and writing, with no traversal check, workspace boundary, symlink resolution or protected-path guard. Anyone who can influence an agent's tool arguments, for example through prompt injection or a malicious YAML workflow, can read secrets like SSH keys and overwrite files.
What it is
src/praisonai/praisonai/tools/multiedit.py uses the filepath argument directly for reading and writing, unlike sibling tools in the same codebase that reject '..', resolve symlinks and enforce a workspace boundary.
The tool is exported through the PraisonAI CLI tools registry, so agents can call it. The advisory gives /etc/shadow, ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.aws/credentials as examples of readable files, and overwriting files allows persistence or tampering with the application.
How to check
- Affected: praisonai (PyPI) before the fixed release. The GitHub advisory lists 4.6.61 as patched; NVD says it is fixed in 4.6.62.
- Check whether your agents have the multiedit tool enabled and process input you don't control.
How to fix
- Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.62 or later.
- Run agents with file tools in a sandbox or container with no access to real credentials.
pip show praisonai | grep -i version Sources
- criticalCVE-2026-57141: PraisonAI's codeMode tool sandbox can be escaped to run OS commands
- criticalCVE-2026-57147: praisonai-platform signs logins with the public secret dev-secret-change-me
- criticalCVE-2026-57139: PraisonAI's npm MCP server and AgentOS let anyone call tools and agents
- criticalCVE-2026-57123: praisonaiagents MCP SSE server exposes every tool with no auth