CVE-2026-115563: MCP Python SDK OAuth clients could hand their client secret, auth code or signed assertion to an authorization server picked by a malicious MCP server (fixed 1.30.0 / 2.2.0)
In the official MCP Python SDK (pip package mcp) 1.9.1 up to 1.30.0 and 2.0.0 up to 2.2.0, the OAuth client support in mcp.client.auth let the MCP server you connect to decide where your OAuth credentials go. The authorization-server issuer was not validated on every discovery path and stored or pre-provisioned credentials were not bound to their authorization server, so a malicious or compromised MCP server could receive the client_secret, authorization code, PKCE code_verifier or a signed client assertion meant for your real authorization server.
What it is
Affected: HTTP MCP clients that use OAuthClientProvider, ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider, PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider or the deprecated 1.x RFC7523OAuthClientProvider as the transport's auth handler, and that may connect to an MCP server you don't fully trust while holding credentials for a legitimate authorization server.
The server can name its own authorization server in its protected resource metadata, or publish none and serve metadata presenting your real authorization server as the issuer; the client then posts its credentials to the server's chosen token endpoint.
1.9.1 through 1.29.1 have no issuer check or credential binding on any path; 2.0.0 through 2.1.1 lack both when the server publishes no protected resource metadata or answers 403 insufficient_scope. ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider and PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider had no way to name their authorization server at all.
Not affected: MCP servers built with the SDK, stdio clients, and clients that attach their own tokens or headers. GitHub published GHSA-qx49-fqc8-xw99 on 28 September 2026; NVD published the CVE on 16 November 2026.
How to check
- Run `pip show mcp` and compare with 1.30.0 (1.x) or 2.2.0 (2.x).
- Search your code for ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider, PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider, OAuthClientProvider and RFC7523OAuthClientProvider, and note which servers those clients connect to.
How to fix
- Upgrade to mcp 1.30.0 or 2.2.0 or later.
- For ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider and PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider the upgrade changes nothing until you also pass issuer= (your real authorization server URL); without it they still follow the server's advertised authorization server.
- If an affected client connected to an untrusted MCP server with these credentials, rotate the client secret or signing key.
pip show mcp | grep -i ^version
grep -rnE 'ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider|PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider|OAuthClientProvider|RFC7523OAuthClientProvider' --include=*.py . Sources
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